Digital interventions are widely promoted as levers of institutional change, yet their effects often prove fragile. In this paper, we examine why some interventions persist while others fade.
Using crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA) on 13 large-scale cases from India and abroad, we identify the configurations of conditions under which digital systems become self-sustaining. We conceptualise persistence as a shift in the Nash equilibrium: when incentives realign, the new behaviour maintains itself without continuing external push.
The analysis shows that software openness is neither necessary nor sufficient for durable change. Instead, six non-technological conditions—regulatory enablement, a credible revenue model, substantial scale, a clearly targeted systemic barrier, presence of enabling prerequisites, and sufficient time—are each necessary and, in combination, sufficient for an equilibrium shift; no single condition is enough on its own. Successful cases (e.g., Aadhaar, UPI, Chalo, Swiggy) meet these conditions in combination, whereas others (e.g., ONDC, DIKSHA, ICDS-CAS) illustrate how missing elements limit institutional embedding. The paper contributes a theory-informed diagnostic that links game-theoretic stability to configurational evaluation and provides practical “if–then” decision rules for appraisal. We argue that policy and investment decisions should prioritise incentive-compatible ecosystems over software attributes, and judge success by whether interventions reconfigure the rules of the game rather than by short-term uptake. This perspective clarifies when digital systems can contribute to sustainable, inclusive institutional transformation.
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(Originally published in MDPI – Publisher of Open Access Journals)
